


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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

The Romanians, European Activists

State Dept. review completed

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18 January 1973
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
18 January 1973

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Romanians, European Activists

Deputy Foreign Minister Ecobescu's meetings in London on 8-9 January and in Washington on the 10th confirmed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the current focus of Bucharest's foreign policy. In both capitals, Ecobescu pressed the case for the creation of permanent European security machinery to oversee the implementation of decisions reached at the conference. His insistence on rotation of the site both for the plenary sessions and conference committees appears designed to pave the way for a proposal that Bucharest host one or more meetings.

With equal determination, Ecobescu stressed the need for the conferees to adopt a declaration governing relations between states. Romanian diplomats in Bucharest have indicated that the solemn principles governing relations between Pakistan and Romania, signed on 10 January by Presidents Ceausescu and Bhutto, could serve as a model. These principles reaffirm:

- a) The inalienable right of all people to decide their own fate.
- b) The sacred right of every state to freedom, national independence and sovereignty.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

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- c) The equality of all states regardless of size, political and economic system.
- d) The right of every state to participate on an equal footing in the solving of international disputes.
- e) Noninterference, under any form or pretext, in the internal or external affairs of other states.
- f) Respect for the inviolability of state frontiers and for the territorial integrity of states.
- g) The obligation of states to refrain, in their international relations, from military, political or economic coercion.
- h) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force under any circumstances.
- i) The settlement of disputes among states by peaceful means.

The Romanians are annoyed at not having received an invitation to attend the opening round of force reduction talks slated to begin 31 January. Ecobescu argued that these discussions should be open to all participants in a European security conference, but Deputy Foreign Minister Gliga, meeting with Dutch officials, suggested that Romania would not insist on participation in the force reduction talks. Neither Ecobescu nor Gliga indicated

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how Bucharest would react if Romania received an invitation to take a limited part in force reduction talks. There is a good chance Bucharest would decline to go if the conferees refused to acknowledge the right of all states to a voice in the discussion of military problems.

Romanian diplomats in Bonn, Belgrade, and Rome tried last week to convince leaders in these capitals that European detente must not be allowed to slip into bloc-to-bloc negotiations. Romania is in this way demonstrating the same tenacity and determination it showed earlier at Helsinki, where Bucharest's 12-man delegation, one of the largest in the Finnish capital, tried valiantly to ensure that Romanian interests were protected.

The guidelines for this Romanian activism were laid down last November by Ceausescu and the party daily Scinteia. In a pre-conference briefing, Ceausescu stressed that because early decisions on procedural questions at the preliminary talks would set precedents, Romanian persistence in advocating its principles was necessary. He instructed the delegation to argue for rotation of the conference presidency and the vice-presidency--a point which the Romanians later lost. The same principle of rotation is likely to apply to the site of all future meetings. It was in this briefing that the Romanians for the first time spelled out their desire for a voice in talks on disarmament and force reductions.

Scinteia, elaborating on Bucharest's objectives, asserted in November that participants should make solemn commitments on the renunciation of force, on the removal of trade barriers, on increased and more diverse exchanges between all states, on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, and on the security of all nations taking part in the talks. Bucharest recognized that a military treaty is out of the question, but it apparently believed that diplomatic and/or economic sanctions could be applied against

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those who violate the principles worked out at a security conference. Here the Romanians seem to have in mind the gradual implementation of a security system based on carefully negotiated international obligations and commitments that will fall under the purview of European security machinery set up by the conference.

The Romanians proved their mettle on the floor at Helsinki. Bucharest's spokesmen showed themselves adroit parliamentarians. Their remarks on the subject of national independence drew a heated Soviet response. They won a technical victory on the rules of procedure, but their formal proposal--that the rules recognize that "all states taking part in the Helsinki conference shall participate as independent and sovereign states under conditions of complete equality, irrespective of their adherence or non-adherence to military alliances"--was not accepted in full. Instead, compromise wording was adopted. It nonetheless incorporated the principal point Romania wanted to make--all delegations will take part in talks on European detente "irrespective of membership in military alliances," and the talks "will take place outside military alliances." After achieving some of their objectives, the Romanians played a less conspicuous role in the remainder of the session.

To inhibit excessive criticism from their allies, the Romanians have cited Warsaw Pact declarations at Budapest in 1970 and at Prague in 1972, both of which in the Romanian view call for a non-bloc approach to force reductions. Furthermore, Romanian officials at home and abroad began trumpeting the argument that European security could not be separated from disarmament talks. The Romanians therefore have a right to be involved in talks which affect their national interest and security.

While the Soviets have shown considerable flexibility in reacting to the Romanians, their displeasure was basic and surfaced in a

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[redacted]

variety of ways and locations. Initial expressions of Soviet annoyance centered on opposition to Romanian proposals for a set of procedural rules that emphasized the sovereignty and independence of all participants. The Soviet delegation in the Finnish capital showed their irritation quite openly. This show was followed by sharp criticism from Soviet diplomats in Bucharest. Indirect criticism appeared in the Eastern European press, and Polish party chief Edward Gierek canceled a visit to Bucharest. Pact diplomats boycotted a number of Romanian social functions, [redacted]

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[redacted] Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov's official visit to Romania from 15 to 18 December was punctuated with veiled criticism of the Romanian position.

The Chinese are leery of European detente and oppose a security conference because they fear that it would leave the Soviets a freer hand to deal with the Chinese. As a result, Peking privately endorsed Romania's efforts to establish itself as an equal in European security talks. The Yugoslavs wholeheartedly back Romania's actions. Both Belgrade and Bucharest have the same goal at the European security talks, each wants to secure as many guarantees as possible vis-a-vis the Soviets.

At the second round of preparatory talks on a security conference, Romania is expected to press for creation of permanent European security machinery--a goal Moscow shares, though for different reasons--for a declaration on the renunciation of force to settle disputes, and for the rotation of sites for future negotiations. Bucharest will support the three-stage format for convening the main conference. This envisions a meeting at the foreign minister level to be followed by detailed work in committees, and, then, a final session at a level to be decided later. Despite its behavior so far, Romania, it should be noted, has not--and will not--attempt deliberately to undercut basic Soviet objectives.

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